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.J ustice ( 'Connor
Recirculateed:--------
SUPREME Court  OF TI~IE UNITEDSTATES 
No. 81-430
ILLINOIS, PETITIONER v. LANCE  GATES  ET ux.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO TI-IE SUPREME COURT 
OF ILLINOIS 
[May , 1 !983 J 
JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in the judgment. 
In my view, the question regarding modification of the ex-
clusionary rule framed in our order of November 29, 1982, 
-- U. S. (1982), is properly before us and should be 
addressed. I continue to believe that the exclusionary rule 
is an inappropriate remedy where law enforcement officials 
act in the reasonable belief that a search and seizure was con-
sistent with the Fourth Amendment-a position I set forth in 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 537-539 (1976). In this case, 
it was fully reasonable for the Bloomingdale, Illinois police to 
believe that their search of respondents' house and automo-
bile comported with the Fourth Amendment as the search 
was conducted pursuant to a judicially-issued warrant. The 
exclusion of probative evidence where the constable has not 
blundered not only sets the criminal free but fails to serve 
any constitutional interest in securing compliance with the 
important requirements of the Fourth Amendment. On this 
basis, I concur in the Court's judgment that the decision of 
the Illinois Supreme Court must be reversed. 
I 
The Court declines to address the exclusionary rule ques-
tion because the Illinois courts were not invited to modify the 
rule in the first instance. The Court's refusal to face this im-
portant q·uestion cannot be ascribed to jurisdictional limita-
• 2
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tions. I fully ag·ree that the statt1te which gives tls jurisdic-
tion in this cau:se , 1 8 U. S. C. § 1257(3}. i)revents us from 
decidi11g federal constitt1tio11al claims raised her e for the first 
tim 011 rev·ie'v of state court decisiot1s. Cardina le v. Lo?ti-
~ iana .. 394 U. S. 437, 438-439 (1969). But it is equally well-
established that "[11]0 p,u·tictllar form of words or phrases is 
esse11tial, btlt 011ly that tl1e claim of invalidity and the ground 
therefore be broug·ht to the atte11tion of the state court with 
fair precision and in due time." St1·eet v. N ew Yotk, 394 U. S. 
576. 584 (1969) (quoting 1Ve~u Yo1·k ex rel. B~ryant v. 
zz:~,n ~Jnernzan!. 278 U. S. 63, 67 (1928)). Notwithstanding the 
select and controversial instances in which the Court has re-
v·ersed a state court decision for "plain error," 1 we have con-
sistently dismissed for want of jurisdiction where the federal 
claim asserted in this Court was not raised below. But this 
obviously is not such a case. As the Court points out, "It is 
clear in this case that respondents expressly raised, at every 
level of the Illinois judicial system, the claim that the Fourth 
Amendment had been violated by the actions of the Illinois 
police and that the evidence seized by the officers should be 
excluded from their trial." Ante, at 5. Until today, we 
have not required more. 
We have never suggested that the jurisdictional stipula-
tions of § 1257 require that all arguments on behalf of, let 
alone in opposition to, a federal claim be raised and decided 
below. 2 See R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Prac-
1 See e. g, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 (1982); Wood v. Georgia, 
450 U. S. 261 (1980); Vachon v. New Hamphsire, 414 U. S. 478 (1974) (per 
curia1n). Of course, to the extent these cases were correctly decided, 
they indicate a fortiori that the exclusionary rule issue in this case is prop-
erly before us. 
2 The Court has previously relied on issues and arguments not raised in 
the state court below in order to dispose of a federal question that was 
properly raised. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 658, the Court held that 
unmarried fathers could not be denied a hearing on parental fitness that 
was afforded other Illinois parents. Although this issue was not pre-
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tice 230 (1978). Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193 (1898) 
distinguished the raising of constitutional claims and the 
making of arguments in support of or inopposition to those 
claims. 
"If the question were only an enlargement of the one 
mentioned in the assignment of errors, or if it were so 
connected with it in substance as to form but another 
ground or reason for alleging the invalidity of the per-
sonal judgment, we should have no hesitation in holding 
the assignment sufficient to permit the question to be 
now raised and argued. Parties are not confined here to 
the same arguments which were advanced in the courts 
below upon a federal question there discussed." 173 
U. S. at 197-198 (emphasis added). 3 
Under Dewey, which the Court hails as the "fullest treatment 
of the subject," ante, at 4, the exclusionary rule issue is but 
another argument pertaining to the Fourth Amendment 
question squarely presented in the Illinois courts. 
The presentation and decision of respondent's Fourth 
Amendment claim fully embraces the argument that due to 
sented in the Illinois courts, the Court found that it could properly be con-
sidered: "we dispose of the case on the constitutional premise raised below, 
reaching the result by a method of analysis readily available to the state 
court. For the same reason, the strictures of Cardinale ... and Hill, 
have been fully observed." 405 U. S., at 658, n. 10. The dissent argued 
that the Court was deciding a due process claim instead of an equal protec-
tion one, but there was no suggestion that it mattered at all that the Court 
had relied on a different type of equal protection argument. 
3 As the Court explains, ante, at 4, n. 2, in Dewey, appellant argued only 
that the imposition of personal liability against him violated the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because he had not received 
personal notice of the assessment proceedings. In this Court, appellant 
sought to raise a takings argument for the first time. The Court declined 
to pass on the issue because, although arising from a single factual occur-
rence the two claims "are not in anywise necessarily connected," 173 U. S., 
at 198. 
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the nature of the alleged Fourth Amendment violation, the 
seized evidence should not be excluded. Our decisions con-
cerning the scope of the exclusionary rule cannot be divorced 
from the Fourth Amendment; they rest on the relationship of 
Fourth Amendment interests to the objectives of the criminal 
justice system. See, e. g. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 
U. S. 268 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976). 4 
Similarly, the issues surrounding a proposed good faith modi-
fication are intricately and inseverably tied to the nature of 
the Fourth Amendment violation: the degree of probable 
cause, the presence of a warrant, and the clarity of previ-
ously announced Fourth Amendment principles all inform the 
good faith issue. The Court's own holding that the duty of a 
reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 
"substantial basis" for concluding that probable cause ex-
isted, ante, at 28, i~~tself but a variation on the good-faith 
theme. See Brie\ o~ Petitioner on Reargument. 
As a jurisdictiona1 requirement, I have no doubt that the 
exclusionary rule question is before us as an indivisible ele-
ment of the claim that the Constitution requires exclusion of 
certain evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment. As a prudential matter, I am unmoved by the Court's 
lengthy discourse as to why it must avoid the question. 
First, the Court turns on its head the axiom that " 'due re-
4 The Court relies on these cases for the surprising assertion that the 
Fourth Amendment and exclusionary rule questions are "distinct." Past 
decisions finding that the remedy of exclusion is not always appropriate 
upon the finding of a Fourth Amendment violation acknowledge the close 
relationship of the issues. For example, in United States v. Ceccolini it 
was said: "The constitutional question under the Fourth Amendment was 
phrased in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963), as whether 
'the connection between the lawless conduct of the police and the discovery 
of the challenged evidence has become so attenuated as to dissipate the 
taint.' " 435 U. S., at 275-276. It is also suprising to learn that the issues 
in Stone v. Powell are "distinct" from the Fourth Amendment. I had un-
derstood the very essence of Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128 (1978) to be 
that standing to seek exclusion of evidence could not be divorced from sub-
stantive Fourth Amendment rights. 
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gard for the appropriate relationship of this Court to state 
courts' McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale, 309 U. S. 430, 
435-436 (1940), demands that those courts be given an oppor-
tunity to consider the constitutionality of the actions of state 
officials" ante, at 6. This statement, written to explain why 
a state statute should not be struck down on federal grounds 
not raised in the state courts, 6 hardly applies when the ques-
tion is whether a rule of federal law articulated by this Court 
should now be narrowed to reduce the scope of federal intru-
sion into the state's administration of criminal justice. Inso-
far as modifications of the federal exclusionary rule are con-
cerned, the Illinois courts are bound by this Court's 
pronouncements. Cf. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714, 719 
(1975). I see little point in requiring a litigant to request a 
state court to overrule or modify one of this Court's prece-
dents. Far from encouraging the stability of our precedents, 
the Court's proposed practice could well undercut stare deci-
sis. Either the presentation of such issues to the lower 
courts will be a completely futile gesture or the lower courts 
are now invited to depart from this Court's decisions when-
ever they conclude such a modification is in order. 6 
5 Consider the full context of the statement in McGoldrick: 
"In cases coming here from state courts in which a state statute is assailed 
as unconstitutional, there are reasons of particular force which should lead 
us to refrain from deciding questions not presented or decided in the high-
est court of the state whose judicial action we are called upon to review. 
Apart from the reluctance with which every court should proceed to set 
aside legislation as unconstitutional on grounds not properly presented, 
due regard for the appropriate relationship of this Court to state courts re-
quires us to decline to consider and decide questions affecting the validity 
of state statutes not urged or considered there. It is for these reasons 
that this Court, where the constitutionality of a statute has been upheld in 
the state court, consistently refuses to consider any grounds of attack not 
raised or decided in that court." 
6 The Court observes that "although the Illinois courts applied the fed-
eral exclusionary rule, there was never 'any real contest' upon the point." 
Ante, at 7. But the proper forum for a "real contest" on the continued 
vitality of the exclusionary rule that has developed from our decisions in 
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The Court correctly notes that Illinois may choose to pur-
sue a different course with respect to the state exclusionary 
rule. If this Court were to formulate a "good faith" excep-
tion to the federal exclusionary rule, the Illinois Supreme 
Court would be free to consider on remand whether the state 
exclusionary rule should be modified accordingly. The pos-
sibility that it might have relied upon the state exclusionary 
rule had the "good-faith" question been posed does not consti-
tute independent and adequate state grounds. "The pos-
sibility that the state court might have reached the same con-
clusion if it had decided the question purely as a matter of 
state law does not create an adequate and independent state 
ground that relieves this Court of the necessity of consider-
ing the federal question." United Air Lines v. Mahin, 410 
U. S. 623, 630-631 (1973); Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U. S. 35, 
37, n. 3 (1967); C. Wright, Federal Courts § 107, p. 488 (2d 
ed. 1970). Nor does having the state court first decide 
whether the federal exclusionary rule should be modified-
and presentation of the federal question does not insure that 
the equivalent state law issue will be raised or decided 7-
avoid the unnecessary decision of a federal question. The 
Court still must reach a federal question to decide the instant 
case. Thus, in today's opinion, the Court eschews modifica-
tion of the exclusionary rule in favor of interring the test es-
tablished by Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964) and 
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969). Nor is the 
exclusionary rule question avoided-it is simply deferred 
until "another day." 
Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1961) and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 
643 (1961) is this Court. 
7 Nor is there any reason for the Illinois courts to decide that question in 
advance of this Court's decision on the federal exclusionary rule. Until 
the federal rule is modified, the state law question is entirely academic. 
The state courts should not be expected to render such purely advisory 
decisions. 
--- -~- --- ~- ~ 
---· .,._......., _ ~---- .-
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It also appears that the Court, in disposing of the case, 
does not strictly follow its own prudential advice. The Illi-
nois Supreme Court found not only a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment but also of Article I, § 6 of the Illinois Constitu-
tion which also provides assurance against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Taking the Court's new prudential 
standards on their own terms, the Illinois courts should be 
given the opportunity to consider in the first instance 
whether a "totality of the circumstances" test should replace 
the more precise rules of Aguilar and Spinelli. The Illinois 
Supreme Court may decide to retain the established test for 
purposes of its state constitution just as easily as it could de-
cide to retain an unmodified exclusionary rule. 8 
Finally, the Court correctly notes that a fully-developed 
record is helpful if not indispensable for the decision of many 
issues. I too resist the decision of a constitutional question 
when such guidance is necessary, but the question of whether 
the exclusionary rule should be modified is an issue of law 
which obviously goes far beyond and depends little on the 
subjective good faith of the police officers that searched the 
Gates' property. Moreover,' the case comes here with a fully 
developed record as to the actions of the Bloomingdale, Illi-
nois police, If further factual development of whether the 
officers in this case acted in good faith were important, that 
issue could should logically be considered on remand, follow-
ing this Court's statement of the proper legal standards. 9 
-8 Respondents urge this precise argument. Brief o~~ Respondent at 
24-27; Brief for Respondent on Reargument, at 6. Of cnurse, under tradi-
tional principles the possibility that the state court might reach a different 
conclusion in interpreting its state constitution does not make it improper 
for us to decide the federal issue. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 
651-653 (1979); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 
562, 568 (1977). 
9 It also should be noted that the requirement that the good faith issue 
be presented to the Illinois courts has little to do with whether the record 
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The Court's straining to avoid coming to grips with the ex-
clusionary rule issue today may be hard for the country to un-
derstand-particularly given earlier statements by some 
members of the Court. 10 The question has been fully briefed 
and argued by the parties and amici curiae, including the 
United States. 11 The issue is central to the enforcement of 
law and the administration of justice throughout the nation. 
The Court of Appeals for the second largest federal circuit 
has already adopted such an exception, United States v. Wil-
liams, 622 U. S. 830 (CA5 1980) (en bane), cert. denied, 449 
U. S. 1127 (1981), and the new Eleventh Circuit is presum-
ably bound by its decision. Several members of this Court 
have for some time expressed the need to consider modifying 
the exclusionary rule, ante, at 9, and Congress as well has 
been active in exploring the question. See The Exclusionary 
Rule Bills, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal 
Law of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 97th Cong; 1st and 
2d Sess. At least one state has already enacted a good faith 
exception. Colo Rev. &at. Tit. 16, Art. 3, § 308. Of course, 
if there is a jurisdictional barrier to deciding the issue, none 
of these considerations are relevant. But if no such proce-
is complete. I doubt that the raising of the good faith issue below would 
have been accompanied by any different record. And this Court may dis-
miss a writ of certiorari as improvidently granted when the record makes 
decision of a federal question unwise. See, e. g., Minnick v. Calif. De-
partment of Corrections, 452 U. S. 105 (1981). 
10 In California v. Minjares, 443 U. S. 916, 928 (1979) (REHNQUIST, J., 
joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, dissenting from the denial of stay), the 
author of the Court's opinion today urged that the parties be directed to 
brief whether the exclusionary rule should be retained. In Minjares, like 
this case, respondents had raised a Fourth Amendment claim but petition-
ers had not attacked the validity of the exclusionary rule in the state court. 
See also Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dis-
senting) (advocating overruling of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961)). 
11 Ironically, in Mapp v. Ohio, supra, petitioners did not ask the Court to 
ovemlle Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25. The sole argument to apply the 
ex~lusionary rule to tl@tes is found in a single paragraph in an_..arnicus 
brief filed by the American Civil Liberties Union. 
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dural obstacle existH, I s .. e it a~ our r0spon~;ibility to end the 
uncertainty and dc<:ide whether the t·ule will be modiH d. 
The question of wh \ther probabl<.\ eauHe cxiHLPd for the iHHU-
ance of a warrant and wh<.\ther· the PvidencP st'tZ('d must be 
excluded in thiH caHP should follow our rpeonsideration of the 
framework by which such iHHUeH, aH they ariHP from the 
F,ourth ArnendnlPnt, are to b .. handled. 
II 
A 
The exclusionary r·ule i~ a remedy adopted by this Court to 
effectuate the I~.,ourth Amendment right of citizens ''to be ~e­
cure in their persons, house~, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searche~ and seizures ... " Although early opin-
ions suggested that the Constitution required exclusion of all 
.illegally obtained evidence, the excluHionary rule ''has never 
been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally 
seized evience in all proceedings or against all persons.'' 
Stone v. Po'well, 428 U. S. 465, 486 (197()). Because of the 
inherent trustworthiness of seized tangible evidence and the 
resulting social costs from its loss through suppression, appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule has been carefully "restricted 
to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most 
efficaciously observed." UrLited States v. Cala'ndra, 414 
U. S. 338, 348 (1974). Even at criminal trials the exclusion-
ary rule has not been applied indiscriminately to ban all ille-
gally obtained evidence without regard to the co:5ts and bene.~-~ ........ 
fits of doing so. lrljra, at . These developments, bo 
of years of experience with the exclusionary rule in op ra-
tion, forcefully suggcHt that the excluHionary rule be more 
generally modified to permit the introduction of evidence ob-
tained in the reasonable good-faith belief that a search or sei-
zure was in accord with the l~ourth Amendm<.~nt. 
This evolvement in the unclerHtanding of the })roper scoi> 
of the excluHionary ·rule embraceH scvt~ral lineH of caHl s. 
First, standing to invoke the cxcluHionary rttle has been liln-
ited to situation~ where the (}overnm 'nt H ' \ks to use such 
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evidence against the victim of the unlawful search. Brown 
v. United States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973); Alderman v. United 
States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U. S. 471, 491-492 (1963); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128 
(1978). 
Second, the rule has not been applied in proceedings other 
than the trial itself. In United States v. Calandra, 414 
U. S. 338 (1974), the Court refused to extend the rule to 
grand jury proceedings. "Any incremental deterrent effect 
which might be achieved by extending the rule to grand jury 
proceedings is uncertain at best. . . . We therefore decline 
to embrace a view that would achieve a speculative and un-
doubtedly minimal advance in the deterrence of police mis-
conduct at the expense of substantially impeding the role of 
the grand jury." !d., at 348. Similarly, in United States v. 
Janis, 428 U. S. 433 (1976), the exclusionary rule was not ex-
tended to forbid the use in the federal civil proceedings of evi-
dence illegally seized by state officials, since the likelihood of 
deterring unlawful police conduct was not sufficient to out-
weigh the social costs imposed by the exclusion. 
Third, even at a criminal trial, the same analysis has led us 
to conclude that the costs of excluding probative evidence 
outweighed the deterrence benefits in several circumstances. 
We have refused to prohibit the use of illegally seized evi-
dence for the purpose of impeaching a defendant who testifies 
in his own behalf. United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620 
(1980); Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954). We 
have also declined to adopt a "per se or 'but for' rule" that 
would make inadmissible any evidence which comes to light 
through a chain of causation that began with an illegal arrest. 
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 603 (1975). And we have 
held that testimony of a live-witness may be admitted, not-
withstanding that the testimony was derived from a conced-
edly unconstitutional search. United States v. Ceccolini, 
435 U. S. 268 (1978). Nor is exclusion required when law 
enforcement agents act in good faith reliance upon a statute 
or ordinance that is subsequently held to be unconstitutional. 
-I 
81-430-CONCUR 
ILLINOIS u. GATES 11 
United States v. Pelt·ier, 422 U. S. 531 (1977), Michigan v. 
DeFillippo, 443 U. S. 31 (1979). 12 Cj: United States v. Cace-
res, 440 U. S. 741, 754-757 (1979) (exclusion not required of 
evidence tainted by violation of an executive department's 
rules concerning electronic eavesdropping). 
A similar balancing approach is employed in our decisions 
limiting the scope of the exclusionary remedy for Fifth 
Amendment violations, Orego'n v. Haas, 420 U. S. 714 (1975); 
Ha·rris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971); Michigan v. 
Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (197 4), and our cases considering 
whether Fourth Amendment decisions should be applied ret-
roactively, United States v. Peltier, supra at 528-539; Wil-
liams v. United States, 401 U. S. 646, 654-655 (1971) (plural-
ity opinion); Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. at 249-250; 
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 636-639. But see 
United States v. Johnson, U. S. (1982). 
These cases reflect that the exclusion of evidence is not a 
personal constitutional right but a remedy, which, like all 
remedies, must be sensitive to the costs and benefits of its 
12 To be sure, Peltier and DeFillippo did not modify the exclusionary 
rule itself. Peltier held that Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 
266, was not to be given retroactive effect; DeFillippo upheld the validity 
of an arrest made in good-faith reliance on an ordinance subsequently de-
clared unconstitutional. The effect of these decisions, of course, was that 
evidence was not excluded because of the officer's good-faith belief that he 
was acting lawfully, and the Court's reasoning, as I discuss below, infra, at 
--, leads inexorably to the more general modification of the exclusionary 
rule I favor. Indeed, JUSTICE BRENNAN recognized this in his dissent in 
Peltier, 422 U. S., at 551-552. 
I recognize that we have held that the exclusionary rule required sup-
pression of evidence obtained in searches carried out pursuant to statutes, 
not previously declared unconstitutional, which purported to authorize the 
searches in question without probable cause and without a valid warrant. 
See, e. g., Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U. S. 465 (1979); Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973); Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 
(1968); Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967). The results in these 
cases may well be different under a "good-faith" exception to the exclusion-
ary rule. . 
Sl--!30--CO .. ,.C R 
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imposition. The trend a11d direction of our exclusionary· rule 
decisions indicate not a le"'ser concern \Vith safeguarding the 
Fourth Amendment btlt a fuller appreciation of the high costs 
incun·ed ,,·hell probatiYe, reliable eYidence is barred because 
of inv·e~ tigativ-e etTor. The primar~y cost, of course. is that 
the exclusio11ar~ .. rttle il1terferes \vith the truthseeking func-
tioil of a criminal trial by· batTing relevant and trust,,·orthy· 
eYidence.•--' ''"e \viii neYer kno\v ho\v mrul) .. guilt)· defendants 
go free as a resttlt of the rule's operatio11. But an) rule of / 
evidence that denies the jury· access to clearly· probati,·e and v' 
reliable e'ide11ce mttst bear a heav·~ btrrde11 of justification. 
and must be carefull)r limited to the circumstances in \Yhich it 
\Vill pay its ''a)' by· deterring official la,,·lessness. I do not 
presume that modification of the exclusional1"' rule ''ill. b·v· it-
self, significant!)' reduce the crime rate but that is no ex-
cuse for indiscriminate application of the rule. 
The suppression doctrine entails other costs as "·ell. It 
\Vould be surprising if the suppression of e\idence garnered 
in good-faith. but by means later found to \riolate the Fourth 
Amendment, did not deter legitimate as ,,·ell as unla''~l po-
lice acti\rities. To the exte11t the rule operates to discourage 
police from reasonable and proper in,·estigativ·e actions. it 
hinders the solution and e,·en the pre,·ention of e1·ime. ..~ 
tremendous burden is also placed on the ~tate and federal ju-
dicial systems. One stud~ re,~eals that on -third of fedet~ 
defendants going to trial file Fourth J.~met1dmet1t ~u.ppre~~ n 
13 The effects of the e.·clu~ionary rul are often f lt bef re ~ere h ~ 
trial. A recent study b ·the National In~titut f Ju8ti of~ l Yn~~ 
in California during the years 1976-197~ ''found l n1 ·or in1 t f th 
clu5ionary rule on state pro~ecutiou~... ati t\al In~titut f Ju~ti , Th 
Effect of the .E .. ·clusionary Rul : • tud~ in l alif rni h 
tudy found that 4. of th mot th n . 000 {! 1 t\Y a~ d 'lin i ~ r . ' 
ecutton were reject d b aus of~ arch nd ~ izu 1 uns. h 
ionary rul \\ra found to hav a parti ularl~ pron un j tl 
c ; pro cutors rej t d app1 . ·im t ly · oa f 11 1 n~ · i 
becau of arch nd s izu probl m . 
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motions, and 70% to 90% of these involve formal hearings. 
Comptroller General of the United States, Impact of the Ex-
clusionary Rule on Federal Criminal Proseuctions 10 (1979). 
The rule also exacts a heavy price in undermining public 
confidence in the reasonableness of the standards that govern 
the criminal justice system. "[A]lthough the [exclusionary] 
rule is thought to deter unlawful police activity in part 
through the nurturing of respect for Fourth Amendment val-
ues, if applied indiscriminately it may well have the opposite 
effect of generating disrespect for the law and the adminis-
tration of justice." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 490-491. 
As THE CHIEF JUSTICE observed in his separate opinion in 
Sto1ze v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 490: "The disparity in particu-
lar cases between the error committed by the police officer 
and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by application of 
the rule is contrary to the idea of proportionality that is es-
sential to the concept of justice." 
For these reasons, "application of the [exclusionary] rule 
has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objec-
tives are thought most efficaciously served." United States v. 
Calandra, supra, at 348. 14 The reasoning of our recent cases 
14 Our decisions applying the exclusionary rule have referred to the "im-
perative of judicial integrity," Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 222 
(1960), although recent opinions of the Court make clear that the primary 
function of the exclusionary rule is to deter violations of the Fourth 
Amendment, Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 486; United States v. Janis, 
428 U. S. 433, 446 (1976); United States v. Calandara, 414 U. S. 338, 348 
(1974). I do not dismiss the idea that the integrity of the courts may be 
compromised when illegally seized evidence is admitted, but I am con-
vinced that the force of the argument depends entirely on the type of 
search or seizure involved. At one extreme, there are lawless invasions of 
personal privacy that shock the conscience and the admission of evidence so 
obtained must be suppressed as a matter of Due Process, entirely aside 
from the Fourth Amendment. See, e. g. Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 
165 (1952). Also deserving of exclusionary treatment are searches and 
seizures perpetrated in intentional and flagrant disregard of Fourth 
Amendment principles. But the question of exclusion must be viewed 
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strongly suggests that there is insufficient justification to 
suppress evidence at a criminal trial which was seized in the 
reasonable belief that the Fourth Amendment was not vio-
lated. The deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule has 
never been established by empirical evidence, despite re-
peated attempts. Un-ited States v. Jan is, 428 U. S., at 
449--453; Irvine v. Calijorrtia, 347 U. S. 128, 136 (1954). But 
accepting that the rule deters some police misconduct, it is 
apparent as a matter of logic that there is little if any deter-
rence when the rule is invoked to suppress evidence obtained 
by a police officer acting in the reasonable belief that his con-
duct did not violate the Fourth Amendment. As we initially 
observed in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S., at 447, and reit-
erated in United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S., at 539: 
"The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule neces-
sarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or 
at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived 
the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evi-
dence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope 
through a different lens when a Fourth Amendment violation occurs be-
cause the police have reasonably erred in assessing the facts, mistakenly 
conducted a search authorized under a presumably valid statute, or relied 
in good-faith upon a warrant not supported by probable cause. In these 
circumstances, the integrity of the courts. The violation of the Fourth ~is not impl · 
Amendment is complete before the evidenc~ is admitted. Thus, "[t]he pri-
mary meaning of 'judicial integrity' in the context of evidentiary rules is 
that the courts must not commit or encourage violations of the Constitu-
tion." United States v. Janis, supra, at 458, n. 35. Cf. United States v. 
Peltier, 422 U. S., at 537 ("The teaching of these retroactivity cases is that 
if the law enforcement officers reasonably believed in good faith that evi-
dence they had seized was admissible at trial, the 'imperative of judicial 
integrity' is not offended by the introduction into evidence of that material 
even if decisions subsequent to the search or seizure have broadened the 
exclusionary rule to encompass evidence seized in that manner.") I am 
content that the interests in judicial integrity run along with rather than 
counter to the deterrence concept, and that to focus upon the latter is to 
promote, not denigrate, the former. 
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to i.nstill in those particular investigating officers, or in 
their future counterparts, a greater degree of care to-
ward the rights of an accused. Where the official action 
was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deter-
rence rationale loses much of its force." 
The Court in Peltier continued, 422 U. S. at 542: 
"If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter un-
lawful police conduct then evidence obtained from a 
search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the 
law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly 
be charged with knowledge, that the search was uncon-
stitutional under the Fourth Amendment." 
See also United States v. Janis, 428 U. S., at 459, n. 35 
("[T]he officers here were clearly acting in good faith . . . a 
factor that the Court has recognized reduces significantly the 
potential deterrent effect of exclusion.") The deterrent 
value of the exclusionary sanction is most effective when offi-
cers engage in searches and seizures under circumstances "so 
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief 
in its existence entirely unreasonable." Brown v. Illinois, 
422 U. S. 590, 610-611 (1975) (POWELL, J. concurring). On 
the other hand, when officers perform their tasks in the good-
faith belief that their action comported with constitutional re-
quirements, the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule is 
so minimal, if not non-existent, that the balance clearly fa-
vors the rule's modi:fication. 15 
15 It has been suggested that the deterrence function of the exclusionary 
rule has been understated by viewing the rule as aimed at special deter-
rence, when, in fact, the exclusionary rule is directed at "affecting the 
wider audience of law enforcement officials and society at large." W. 
LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure 6 (1983 Supp.). I agree that the exclusion-
ary rule's purpose is not only, or even primarily, to deter the individual 
police officer involved in the instant case. It appears that this objection 
assumes that the proposed modification of the exclusionary rule will turn 
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B 
There are several types of Fourth Amendment violations 
that may be said to fall under the rubric of "good faith." 
"There will be those occasions where the trial or appellate 
court will disagree on the issue of probable cause, no matter / 
how reasonable the grounds for arrest appeared to the officer 
and though reasonable men could easily differ on the ques-
tion. It also happens that after the events at issue have oc-
curred, the law may change, dramatically or ever so slightly, 
but in any event sufficiently to require the trial judge to hold 
that there was not probable cause to make the arrest and to 
seize the evidence offered by the prosecution .... " Stone v. 
only the subjective "good-faith" of the officer. Grounding the modification 
in objective reasonableness however, retains the value of the exclusionary 
rule as an incentive for the law enforcement profession as a whole to con-
duct themselves in accord with the Fourth Amendment. Dunaway v. 
New York, 442 U. S. 200, 221 (STEVENS, J., concurring). 
Indeed, the present indiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule 
may hinder the educative and deterrent function of the suppression rem-
edy. "Instead of disciplining their employees, police departments gener-
ally have adopted the attitude that the courts cannot be satisfied, that the 
rules are hopelessly complicated and subject to change, and that the sup-
pression of evidence is the court's problem and not the departments'." J. 
Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1027, 1050 
(1974). If evidence is suppressed only when a law enforcment officer 
should have known that he was violating the Fourth Amendment, police 
departments may look more seriously at the officer's misconduct when sup-
pression is invoked. Moreover, by providing that evidence gathered in 
good-faith reliance on a reasonable rule will not be excluded, a good-faith 
rule creates an incentive for police departments to formulate rules govern-
ing activities of officers in the search and seizure area. Many commen-
tators, including proponents of the exclusionary rule, recognize that the 
formulation of such rules by police departments, and the training necessary 
to implement these guidelines in practice, is perhaps the most effective 
means of protecting Fourth Amendment rights. SeeK. Davis, Discretion-
ary Justice (1971); McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 Mich. L. 
Rev. 659 (1972); A. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 
58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 416-431 (1974). 
81-430--CONCUR 
ILLINOIS u. GATES 17 
Powell, 428 U. S., at 539-540. (WHITE, J., dissenting). The 
argument for a good-faith exception is strongest, however, ~h~~ law enforcement officers have relied in good faith on a / 
JUdicially-issued search warrant. 
This Court has never articulated a rationale for applying 
the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained pursuant 
to a search warrant; it has simply done so without consider-
ing whether Fourth Amendment interests will be served. It 
is my view that they will not be. When officers have duti-
fully obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate, 
and execute the warrant as directed by its t erms, exclusion of 
the evidence thus obtained cannot be expected to deter fu-
ture reliance on such warrants. The warrant is prima-facie 
pr oof that the officers acted reasonably in conducting the 
search or seizure; "once the warrant issues, there is literally 
nothing more than the policeman can do in seeking to comply 
with the law. " Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 498 (BURGER, 
C. J. , concurring). 16 As JUSTICE STEVENS put it in writing 
for the Court in United States v. Ross, U. S. , --
(1982): "A warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices 
to establish," that a law enforcement officer has "acted in 
good faith in conducting the search." Nevertheless, the 
warrant may be invalidated because of a technical defect or 
because, as in this case, the magistrate issued a warrant on 
information later determined to fall short of probable cause. 
Excluding evidence for these reasons can have no possible 
deterrent effect on future police conduct, unless it is to make 
16 The Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime concluded that 
the situation in which an officer relies on a duly authorized warrant 
"is a particularly compelling example of good faith. A warrant is a judi-
cial mandate to an officer to conduct a search or make an arrest, and the 
officer has a sworn duty to carry out its provisions. Accordingly, we be-
lieve that there should be a rule which states that evidence obtained pursu-
ant to an within the scope of a warrant is prima facie the result of good 
faith on the part of the officer seizing the evidence." 
Final Report 55 (1981). 
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off]c ~rs I ss willing to j th . . 
xclusionar r · . < 0• 'Ir duty· lnd · •d, aJJl)lying th ~ 
tl. l' · Y. uJ to Wc:trr,tnt s •arth<•s may well r ·due in · n- / ves LOr t)ohc to ut·t·,. tt . wh . · t 1 lZ ' rl • prpfpr·r£'d warrant J>roeedur 
n a W~trrantl ss H<•tu· ·h may b • p )rmissiblP undt.r on • of 
the el:.itabhsh 'd 'XC 'Ptions to th.:• warrant rc•quirem •nt. S ~e 
a'n,te, at 21; B ·J·ol,on v. Jlll>noi."l, 4~2 lJ. 1 ., at fill, and n . 3 
(POWE~L, J., concut·ring); ] . ,JohnHon, N Jjw Approach cas to 
Enforcing th · Fourth An1 'nclm •nl t 1 (Working JJaJ>er, 1 H7H). 
Se also l! n,·ited Sta,tes v. l ! nJteli Sl(Jte.~ JJ~,:.'l tr·ict ()o'u/rt, 407 
U. S. 297, 316-317 ( 1972); [ ] 'n/ited St(.tte.'1 v. Ve'r~tre.'lCCL, :380 
u. s. 102, 106--107 (19()5). 
Opponents of the proposed "reasonable belier' exception 
suggest that such a modification would allow magistrates and 
judges to flout the probable cause requirements in issuing 
waiTants. This is a novel concept: the exclusionary rule was 
adopted to deter unlawful searches by police, not to punish 
the eiTors of magistrates and judges. Magistrates must be 
neutral and detached from law enforcement operations and I 
would not presume that a modification of the exclusionary 
rule will lead magistrates to abdicate their responsibility to 
apply the law. 17 In any event, I would apply the exclusion-
ary rule when it is plainly evident that a magistrate or judge 
17 Much is made of Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U. S. 345 (1971), 
where we held that magistrates need not be legally trained. Shadwick's 
holding was quite ~arrow. First, the Court insisted that "an issuing mag-
istrate must meet two tests. He must be neutral and detached, and he 
must be capable of determining whether probable cause exists for the re-
quested arrest or search." 407 U. S., at 345. Second, in Shadwick, the 
court clerk's authority extended only to the relatively straightforward task 
of issuing arrest warrants for breach of municipal ordinances. To issue 
search warrants, an individual must be capable of making the probable 
cause judgments involved. In this regard, I reject the Court's insinuation 
that it is too much to expect that persons who issue warrants remain 
abreast of judicial refinements of probable cause. Ante, at 20. Finally, as 
indicated in text, I do not propose that a warrant clearly lacking a basing in 
probable cause can support a "good-faith" defense to invocation of the ex-
clusionary rule. 
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had no business issuing a warrant. See, e. g., Aguilar v. 
Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964); Nathanson v. United States, 290 /' 
U. S. 41 ~1933). Similarly, the good-faith exception would / 
~ot apply if the material presented to the magistrate or judge 
IS false or misleading, Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, or 
so clearly lacking in probable cause that no well-trained offi-
cer could reasonably have thought that a warrant should . 
ISSUe. 
Another objection is that a reasonable belief exception will 
encompass all searches and seizures on the frontier of the 
Fourth Amendment, that such cases will escape review on 
the question of whether the officer's action was permissible, 
denying needed guidance from the courts and freezing 
Fourth Amendment law in its present state. These fears 
are unjustified. The premise of the argument is that a court 
must first decide the reasonable belief issue before turning to 
the question on whether a Fourth Amendment violation has 
occurred. I see no need for such an inflexible practice. 
When a Fourth Amendment case presents a novel question of 
law whose resolution is necessary to guide future action by 
law enforcement officers and magistrates, there is sufficient 
reason for the Court to decide the violation issue before turn-
ing to the good-faith question. Indeed, it may be difficult to 
determine whether the officers acted reasonably until the 
Fourth Amendment issue is resolved. 18 In other circum-
18 Respondents and some amici contend that this practice would be in-
consistent with the Article III requirement of an actual case or contro-
versy. I have no doubt that a defendant who claims that he has been sub-
jected to an unlawful search or seizure and seeks suppression of the 
evidentiary fruits thereof raises a live controversy within the Article III 
authority of federal courts to adjudicate. It is fully appropriate for a court 
to decide whether there has been a wrong before deciding what remedy to 
impose. When questions of good-faith immunity have arisen under 42 
U. S. C. § 1983, we have not been constrained to reach invariably the im-
munity question before the violation issue. Compare O'Connor v. 
Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563 (1975) (finding constitutional violation and re-
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stances, however, a suppression motion poses no Fourth 
Amendment question of broad import-the issue is simply 
whether the facts in a given case amounted to probable 
cause in these cases, it would be prudent for a reviewing 
court to immediately turn to the question of whether the offi-
cers acted in good faith. Upon finding that they had, there 
would generally be no need to consider the probable cause 
question. I doubt that our Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence would suffer thereby. It is not entirely clear to me 
that our law in this area has benefitted from the constant 
pressure of fully-litigated suppression motions. The result 
usually has been that initially bright-line rules have disap-
peared in a sea of ever-finer distinctions. Moreover, there is 
much to be said for having our Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence evolve in part, albeit perhaps at a slower pace, in other 
settings. 19 
manding for consideration of good-faith defense) with Procunier v. 
Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 566, n. 14 (1978) (finding good-faith defense 
first). Similarly, we have exercisd discretion in at times deciding the mer-
its of a claim even though the error was harmless, while on other occasions 
resolving the case solely by reliance on the harmless error doctrine. Com-
pare Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U. S. 371, 372 (1972) (declining to decide 
whether admission of confession was constitutional violation because error, 
if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt), with Coleman v. Ala-
bama, 399 U. S. 1 (1970) (upholding right to counsel at preliminary hearing 
and remanding for harmless error determination). 
19 For example, a pattern or practice of official conduct that is alleged to 
violate Fourth Amendment rights may be challenged by an aggrieved indi-
vidual in a suit for declaratory or injunctive relief. See, e. g. Zurcher v. 
Stanford Daily, 436 U. S. 547 (1978). (Of course, there are limits on the 
circumstances in which such actions will lie. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362 
(1976); Los Angeles v. Lyons, U. S. (1983)). Although a munici-
pality is not liable under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 on a theory of respondeat Supe-
rior, local governing bodies are subject to suit for constitutional torts re-
sulting from implementation of local ordinances, regulations, policies, or 
even customary practices. Monnell v. Department of Social Services, 436 
U. S. 658 (1978). Such entities enjoy no immunity defense that might im-
pede resolution of the substantive constitutional issue. Owen v. City of 
Independence, 445 U. S. 622 (1980). In addition, certain state courts 
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Finally it is t d d . diffi ' con en e that a good-faith exception will be 
. ~ult to appl~ in practice. This concern appears grounded 
1"? t e assumption that courts would inquire into the subjec- / 
tive belief of the law enforcement officers involved. I would 
esche": such investigations. "Sending state and federal 
courts Into the minds of police officers would produce a grave 
and fruitless allocation of judicial resources." M assachu-
setts v. Pain'fen, 389 U. S. 560, 565 (1968) (WHITE, J., dis-
senting). Moreover, "[s]ubjective intent alone ... does not 
make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional." 
Scott v. United States, 436 U. S. 128 (1978). Just last Term, 
we modified the qualified immunity public officials enjoy in 
suits seeking damages for alleged deprivations of constitu-
tional rights under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, eliminating the subjec-
tive component of the standard. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
-- U. S. (1982). Although searches pursuant to a 
warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonable- 1 
ness, I would measure the reasonableness of a particular ~· 
search or seizure only by objective standards. Even for 
warrantless searches, the requirement should be no more dif-
ficult to apply than the closely related good-faith test which 
governs civil suits under § 1983. In addition, the burden will 
likely be offset by the reduction in the number of cases which 
will require ~elo~gated considerations of the probable cause 
question, and will be greatly outweighed by the advantages 
in limiting the bite of the exclusionary rule to the field in 
which it is most likely to have its intended effects. 
, ttr~ 
Since a majority of the Court deems it inappropriate to ad-
may continue to suppress, as a matter of state law, evidence in state trials 
for any Fourth Amendment violation. These cases would likely provide a 
sufficient supply of state criminal cases in which to resolve unsettled ques-
tions of Fourth Amendment law. As a final alternative, I would entertain 
the possibility of according the benefits of a new Fourth Amendment rule 
to the party in whose case the rule is first announced. See Stovall v. 
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dress the good f · th · . 
the Court d at Issue, I bnefly address the question that 
search oe~ reach-whether the warrant authorizing the 
t. . and seiZure of respondents' car and home was con-
s Itu~wnally valid. Abandoning the "two-pronged test" of 
AgY:zlar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. Un.zt~d States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969), the Court upholds the 
validity of the warrant under a new "totality of the circum-
stances" approach. Although I agree that the warrant 
should be upheld, I reach this conclusion in accordance with 
the Aguilar-Spinelli framework. 
A 
/ 
F or pr esent purposes, the A guilar-Spinelli rules can be 
summed up as follows. First, an affidavit based on an in-
former's tip, standing alone, cannot provide probable cause 
for issuance of a warrant unles~ the tip includes information 
that ap~Ases the magistrate of the informant's basis for con-
cluding t at the contraband is where he claims it is (the 
"basis of knowledge" prong), and the affiant informs the 
magistrate of his basis for believing that the informant is 
credible (the "veracity'' prong). Aguilar, supra, at 114; 
Spinelli, supra, at 412-413, 416.20 Second, if a tip fails under 
either or both of the two prongs, probable cause may yet be 
established by independent police investigatory work that 
20 The "veracity'' prong is satisfied by a recitation in the affidavit that the 
informant previously supplied accurate information to the police, see 
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 300, 303--304 (1967), or by proof that the in-
formant gave his information against his penal interest, see United States 
v. Harris, 403 U. S. 573, 583-584 (1971) (plurality opinion). The "basis of 
knowledge" prong is satisfied by a statement from the informant that he 
personally observed the criminal activity, or, if he came by the information 
indirectly, by a satisfactory explanation of why his sources were reliable, 
or, in the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the in-
formation was gathered, by a description of the accused's criminal activity 
in sufficient detail that the magistrate may infer that the informant is r ely-
ing on something more substantial than casual rumor or an individual's 
general reputation. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410, 416 (1969). 
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corroborates the ti t 
the inference that ~h o ~uch an extent that it supports "both 
and that h d . e Informer was generally trustworthy 
tained · e mt e hzs charge on the basis of information ob-
stance In a re zable way·" Spinelli, .supra, at 417. In in-
u . 8 ~here the officers rely on corroboration, the ultimate 
q est~on IS _whether the corroborated tip "is as trustworthy 
as a tip WhiCh would pass Aguilar's tests without independ-
ent corroboration." I d., at 415. 
. In t~e present case, it is undisputed that the anonymous 
tip, by Itself, did !!£t furnish probable cause. The question is 
whether those portions of the affidavit describing the results 
of the police investigation of the respondents, when consid-
ered in light of the tip, "would permit the suspicions engen-
dered by the informant's report to ripen into a judgment that 
a crime was probably being committed." Spinelli, supra, at 
418. The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the corrobo-
ration was insufficient to permit such a ripening. App. 9a. 
The court reasoned as follows: 
"[T]he nature of the corroborating evidence in this case 
would satisfy neither the "basis of knowledge" nor the 
"veracity" prong of Aguilar. Looking to the affidavit 
submitted as support for Detective Mader's request that 
a search warrant issue, we note that the corroborative 
evidence here was only of innocent activity. Mader's in-
dependent investigation rev-ealed only that Lance and 
Sue Gates lived on Greenway Drive; that Lance Gates 
booked passage on a flight to Florida; that upon arriving 
he entered a room registered to his wife; and that he and 
his wife left the hotel together by car. The corrobora-
tion of innocent activity is insufficient to support a find-
ing of probable cause." App. 12a. 
In my view, the lower court's characterization of the Gates' 
activity here as totally "innocent" is dubious. In fact, the 
behavior was quite suspicious. I agree with the Court, ante, 
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to be a so 
t I urce of narcotics th b . 
e' and apparent imm d' t e rieLovernight stay in a mo-t~at ~rained law-enfor~e Ia e retu N rth, suggest a pattern 
dicative of illicit dru -d mli~nt offi~~rs have recognized as in-
Ev h g ea ng activity. zt 
en, owever had th b . 
pletely innocuous' . . ~ corr~ oratwn related only to com-
elude th . activities, this fact alone would not pre-
e Issuance of a valid t Th . . . . not whether th . . . warran · e critical 1ssue 1s 
. . e activities observed by the police are innocent 
orh suspicious. Instead, the proper focus should be on ~ eth~r the act~ons of the suspects, whatever their nature, 
give rise to an Inference that the informant is credible and I 
that he obtained his information in a reliable manner. 
. Thus, in Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 (1959), an 
Informant stated on Sept. 7 that Draper would be carrying 
narcotics when he arrived by train in Denver on the morning 
of Sept. 8 or Sept. 9. The informant also provided the police 
with a detailed physical description of the clothes Draper 
would be wearing when he alighted from the train. The po-
lice observed Draper leaving a train on the morning of Sept. 
9, and he was wearing the precise clothing described by the 
informant. The Court held that the police had probable 
cause to arrest Draper at this point, even though the police 
had seen nothing more than the totally innocent act of a man 
getting off a train carrying a briefcase. As we later ex-
plained in Spinelli, the important point was that the corrobo-
ration showed both that the informant was credible, i. e. that 
he "had not been fabricating his report out of whole cloth," 
Spinelli, supra, at 417, and that he had an adequate basis of 
knowledge for his allegations, "since the report was of the 
sort which in common experience may be recognized as hav-
ing been obtained in a reliable way." ld., at 417-418. The 
fact that the informer was able to predict, two days in ad-
vance, the exact clothing Draper would be wearing dispelled 
21 See ante, at 26; United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 562 (1980) 
(POWELL, J., concurring). 
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the ·b·1· poss1 1 tty that his tip was just based on rumor or "an off-
hand remark heard at a neighborhood bar." I d., at 417. 
~robably Draper had planned in advance to wear these spe-
crfic c_lothes so that an accomplice could identify him. A 
clear Inference could therefore be drawn that the informant 
was either involved in the criminal scheme himself or that he 
otherwise had access to reliable, inside information. 22 
As in Drape'r, the police investigation in the present case 
satisfactorily demonstrated that the informant's tip was as 
trustworthy as one that would alone satisfy the Aguilar 
tests. The tip predicted that Sue Gates would drive to Flor-
ida, that Lance Gates would fly there a few days after May 3, 
and that Lance would then drive the car back. After the po-
lice corroborated these facts, 23 the magistrate could reason-
ably have inferred, as he apparently did, that the informant, 
who had specific knowledge of these unusual travel plans, did 
not make up his story and that he obtained his information in 
a reliable way. It is theoretically possible, as respondents 
insist, that the tip could have been supplied by a "vindictive 
travel agent" and that the Gates' activities, although unusual, 
might not have been unlawful. 24 But Aguilar and Spinelli, 
22 Thus, as interpreted in Spinelli, the Court in Draper held that there 
was probable cause because "the kind of infonnation related by the infor-
mant [was] not generally sent ahead of a person's arrival in a city except to 
those who are intimately connected with making careful arrangements for 
meeting him." Spinelli, supra, at 426 (WHITE, J., concurring). As I said 
in Spinelli, the conclusion that Draper itself was based on this fact is far 
from inescapable. Prior to Spinelli, Draper was susceptible to the inter-
pretation that it stood for the proposition that "the existence of the tenth 
and critical fact is made sufficiently probable to justify the issuance of a 
warrant by verifying nine other facts coming from the same source." 
Spinelli, supra, at 42~27 (WHITE, J., concurring). But it now seems 
clear that the Court in Spinelli rejected this reading of Draper. 
23 JusTICE STEVENS is correct, post, at 1, that one of the infonnant's / 
predictions proved to be inaccurate. However, I agree with the Court, 
ante, at 28, n. 14, that an informant need not be infallible. 
24 It is also true, as JUSTICE STEVENS points out, post, at 2, n. 3, that the 
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like our other ca d . 
tabli h d b f, ses, o not require that certain guilt be es-
th s e .e. ore a warrant may properly be issued. "[O]nly 
t" ~ pr?bab1hty, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal ac-
IVIty !s. the standard of probable cause." Spinelli, supra, at 
j,19 (citmg Beck v. Ohio, _379 U. S. 89, 96 (1964)). I there-
ore conclude that the JUdgment of the Illinois Supreme 
Court invalidating the warrant must be reversed. 
B 
The Court agrees that the warrant was valid, but, in the 
process of reaching this conclusion, it overrules the Aguilar-
Spinelli tests and replaces them with a "totality of the cir-
cumstances" standard. As shown above, it is not at all nee- \ 
essary to overrule Aguilar-Spinelli in order to reverse the ) 
judgment below. Therefore, because I am inclined to be-
lieve that, when applied properly, the Aguilar-Spinelli rules 
play an appropriate role in probable cause determinations, 
and because the Court's holding may foretell an evisceration 
of the probable cause standard, I do not join the Court's 
holding. 
The Court reasons, ante, at 18, that the "veracity" and 
"basis of knowledge" tests are not independent, and that a 
deficiency as to one can be compensated for by a strong show-
ing as to the other. Thus, a finding of probable cause may be 
based on a tip from an informant "known for the unusual reli-
ability of his predictions" or from "an unquestionably honest 
citizen," even if the report fails thoroughly to set forth the 
basis upon which the information was obtained. Ibid. If 
fact that respondents were last seen leaving West Palm Beach on a north-
bound interstate highwa~is far from conclusive proof that they were head-
ing directly to Bloomington. It indeed was entirely possible that they 
were innocently heading to Disney World, Cape Canaveral, or even Wash-
ington, D.C. But it is rather improbable that an ordinary vacationer 
would fly into a city one evening and then, at 7:00 the next morning, leave 
in a car with a false license plate for a day of sightseeing in a different 
location. 
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this is so, then it must follow a fortiori that "the affidavit of 
an officer, known by the magistrate to be honest and experi-
~nc,~d, stating that [contraband] is located in a certain build- . 
Ing must be acceptable. Spinelli, 393 U. S., at 424 
(WHITE, J., concurring). It would be "quixotic" if a similar 
statement from an honest informant, but not one from an 
honest officer, could furnish probable cause. Ibid. But 
we have repeatedly held that the unsupported assertion or 
belief of an officer does not satisfy the probable cause re-
quirement. See, e. g., Whitely v. Warden, 401 U. S. 560, 
564-565; Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 269 (1960); 
Nathanson v. United States, 290 U. S. 41 (1933).25 Thus, 
this portion of today's holding can be read as implicitly reject-
ing the teachings of these prior holdings. 
The Court may not intend so drastic a result. Indeed, the 
Court expressly reaffirms, ante, at 24, the validity of cases 
such as Nathanson that have held that, no matter how reli-
able the affiant-officer may be, a warrant should not be is-
sued unless the affidavit discloses supporting facts and cir-
cumstances. The Court limits these cases to situations 
involving affidavits containing only "bare conclusions" and 
holds that, if an affidavit contains anything more, it should be 
left to the issuing magistrate to decide, based solely on "prac-
tical[ity]" and "common-sense," whether there is a fair prob-
ability that contraband will be found in a particular place. 
Ibid. 
Thus, as I read the majority opinion, it appears that the 
question whether the probable cause standard is to be diluted 
is left to the common-sense judgments of issuing magistrates. 
I am reluctant to approve any standard that does not ex-
pressly require, as a prerequisite to issuance of a warrant, 
some showing of facts from which an inference may be drawn 
25 I have already indicated my view, supra, at , that such a ''bare-
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that the informant is credible and that his information was 
o~tained in a reliable way. The Court is correctly concerned / 
With the fact that some lower courts have been applying ¥ 
Aguilar-Spinelli in an unduly rigid manner. 26 I believe, 
however, that with clarification of the rule of corroborating 
information, the lower courts are fully able to properly inter-
pret Aguilar-Spinelli and avoid such unduly-rigid applica-
tions. I may be wrong; it ultimately may prove to be the 
case that the only profitable instruction we can provide to 
magistrates is to rely on common sense. But the question 
whether a particular anonymous tip provides the basis for is-
suance of a warrant will often be a difficult one, and I would 
at least attempt to provide more precise guidance by clarify-
ing Aguilar-Spinelli and the relationship of those cases with 
Draper, before totally abdicating our responsibility in this 
area. Hence, I do not join the Court's opinion rejecting the 
Aguilar-Spinelli rules. 
26 Bridger v. State, 503 S. W. 2d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), and Peo,ple 
v. Palanza, 371 N. E. 2d 687 (Ill. App. 1978), which the Court describes 
ante, at 19, n. 9, appear to me to be excellent examples of overly-technical 
applications of the Aguilar-Spinelli standard. The holdings in these cases 
could easily be disapproved without reliance on a "totality of the circum-
stances" analysis. 
